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Abstract
This paper focuses on resilient control of networked control systems (NCSs)
under the denial of service (DoS) attacks which is characterized by a Markov
process. Firstly, the packets dropout are modeled as Markov process according
to the game between attack strategies and defense strategies. Then, an NCS
under such game results is modeled as a Markovian jump linear system and
four theorems are proved for the system stability analysis and controller design.
Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrative the application of these
theorems.
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1. Introduction
Networked control systems (NCSs) have received an increasing attention in
the past decades. Now, NCSs have been widely applied in industrial processes,
electric power networks, intelligent transportation and so on ( [1, 2, 3, 4]).
With the growing of the NCSs, network, as a critical element in an NCS, is5
vulnerable to cyber-threats which can menace the control systems ([5, 10]). In
the presence of network attacks or unreliable links, the separation design of the
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network security and the networked controller is no longer available. Therefore,
the design of NCSs under consideration of network attacks is extremely urgent
([6, 7]). A most common network attack style is so-called denial of service (DoS).10
DoS attacks usually prevent the information exchange through a large volume
invalid data to deliberately consume the network resources. Control problems
in the presence of network attacks have been discussed in some recent works,
such as in [8, 9, 11, 12]. On the one hand, an attacker would do it best to
degrade the performance of the NCSs from the perspective of their own. In the15
scenario that DoS occurred during the data transmission between sensor and
remote estimator with energy constraints, an optimal attack schedules that to
maximize the expected average estimation error is studied in [9]. Considering
the limitation of attackers, a feedback controller that maximize a given function
subjected to safety and power constraints is designed for a class of DoS attack20
models in [13]. A two-player zero-sum stochastic game is formulated to model
the dynamic interactions between a jammer (attacker) and a sensor transmitter
(defender) in [14]. On the other hand, the stability of NCS should be guaranteed
when attack occurred from the perspective of controller design. For a signal-
input remote control system, a control strategy with placing poles method is25
studied under the periodic DoS attack in [8]. Under a certain condition of
frequency and duration of DoS, the input-to-state stability for the closed loop
is analyzed in [11]. A hidden Markovian model which is used to describe the
attacker jams the control packets stochastically and the stability problem are
investigated in [15]. However, there are few works on the stochastic consecutive30
packets dropout, these issues motivate the current study.
Generally, the attacker's purpose is to prevent the updating of control signal
for the DoS attacks. That is to say, packet dropout would occur due to the
DoS attacks and induce the instability of the control systems by denying the
communication of control signal. Traditionally, the robust control strategies35
which only consider the worst case of QoS (Quality of Service) are often used
to stabilize the NCSs. However, these robust controllers are deemed to lack
of exibility and adaptability. So, more exible control strategies which can
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settle the stability problem of the NCSs with the consideration of the concrete
behaviors of packets dropout should be designed. Contributions to this topic40
in the NCSs have been reported in [17, 18, 19, 20]. The stability and its con-
troller design of networked control systems with both arbitrary and Markovian
packet losses are established via a packet-loss depended Lyapunov approach in
[16]. For a class of continuous-time and discrete-time Markovian jump linear
system (MJLS) with partly unknown transition probabilities, the stability and45
stabilization problems are investigated in [18]. Without the knowledge of all
the transition probabilities, packet-loss-dependent switching controllers which
considered both the packet-loss and time delay are designed in [19]. However,
network attacks are ignored in the above mentioned works. These motivates the
current study.50
The objective of this paper is to design a resilient control strategy to resist the
DoS attacks for a class of NCSs. Dierent from the single robust controller, we
aim to nd a group of controllers to deal with varying degrees of DoS attacks,
resiliently. In fact, the packets dropout can be seen as the results of game
between attack and defense. However, these results are stochastic and can be55
described with Markov process. The main contributions of the paper can be
summarized as:
(a) Due to the stochastic game between both sides of attack and defense, the
packets dropout induced by the DoS attacks is modeled by a Markov process
with full or part transition probabilities, and an MJLS model is well constructed60
to describe the networked control systems under the condition of stochastic
noises. This is convenience for us to design the resilient controller for the studied
system under the DoS attacks; and
(b) Based on the proposed MJLS model according to the results of game
between attack and defense, a stability criterion and a stabilization criterion are65
established for the system under consideration with the stochastic DoS attacks
and stochastic noise. Since the full transition probabilities are not needed, the
designed control scheme is resilient to the DoS attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, the MJLS model
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of the studied system is formulated under consideration of the DoS attacks and70
the feedback noise; In section III, some results about stochastic stability criteria
under network attacks are derived with the full and partial-known transition
probabilities; The following section IV shows the numerical simulations to verify
the given results; The last section V concludes this paper.
2. Problem Formulation75
In this section, the problem of secure control for discrete-time linear system
is formulated under consideration of the stochastic characteristic of the DoS
attacks.
A typical scenario of an NCS under the DoS attack and the stochastic feed-
back noise is depicted in Fig. 1. The plant in Fig.1 is80
_x(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (1)
where x(t) 2 <n is the state vector, u(t) 2 <m is the control input. A, B are
constant matrices with appropriate dimensions.
Plant SensorActuator
Controller
NetworkAttack Noise
Fig. 1 A scenario of an NCS under the DoS attacks and the stochastic noise
Suppose the control signal u(t) is hold by zero-order-hold style with sampling
period T0. Then the discrete-time model can be represented as
x0(k + 1) = G0x(k) +H0u(k) (2)
where G0 = e
AT0 ,H0 = B
R T0
0
eAd and 0 represents there is no DoS attack.85
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In ideal network state, the sensor and control signal can be updated every
T0 time. However, due to the vulnerability of network, the transmission of
sensor or control signal is often blocked by an attacker which may cause the
denial of service. We consider the scenario that there is an attacker between
controller and actuator. Denote i as the subsystem that there are i-consecutive90
packets dropout for i subsystem. Then, these i-consecutive packets would not
be received by actuator and the actuator generate an input that is based on the
most recently received control signal until the end of attacks. The details can
be seen as Fig.2.
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Fig. 2 Control signal update under DoS
When the control packets are jammed, the varying sampling period method95
can be adopted to obtain the discrete-time system by [21, 22]. So, if there are
i-consecutive packets dropout, the forms of discrete-time system are as follows
xi(k + 1) = Gix(k) +Hiu(k) (3)
where Gi = e
A(i+1)T0 ,Hi = B
R (i+1)T0
0
eAd . And, the subsystem i can
jump to the subsystem j in Markov transition probability for all i; j 2 S.
According to [15] [16], suppose the i take values in set S = f1; 2;    ;Mg which100
the maximum M represents the energy constraint of attack, then the above
attack process with packets dropout can be modeled as Markovian jump linear
systems based on the following fact:
Suppose that the attacker adopt attack strategies A = fa1; a2;    ; aMg and
the defender adopt defend strategies D = fd1; d2;    ; dMg, the results between105
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attack and defense which indicated by packets dropout S = f1; 2;    ;Mg can
be seen as stochastic and
Denition 1 : For a given ve-element set (
; A;D; S; P ), packets dropout due
to Markov modulated DoS attack takes nite values in i 2 S and the transition
probabilities are given110
pij(ai; dj) = Pr(j(k + 1) = jji(k) = i) (4)
where the transition probability represents that packets dropout shift from i to
j if attacker adopt attack strategy ai and the defender adopt defend strategy
dj . Hereafter, the pij(ai; dj) will be denoted as pij for simplicity.
Thus, two categories of the transition probability matrix are shown
(I) Full-information transition probability matrix which represents these all115
known games behavior can be obtained completely
P =
0BBBBBB@
p11 p12    p1M
p21 p22    p2M
...
...
...
...
pM1 pM2    pMM
1CCCCCCA (5)
where pij  0 and
MP
j=1
pij = 1.
(II) Partial-known transition probability matrix which represents only par-
tial games behavior are known can be obtained120
P =
0BBBBBB@
p11 p12 X    p1M
X p22 p23    X
...
...
...
...
...
pM1 X X    pMM
1CCCCCCA (6)
where pij are known transition probabilities as in (5) and X are unknown tran-
sition probabilities.
Remark 1: If the eect of attack strategy ai and defense strategy dj are
not clear, we have reason to modeling them to the unknown probability. In
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addition, in order to perceived the real-time information of packets dropout,125
the TCP-based platform with acknowledgment mechanism should be adopted.
To make the proposed model more suitable for practical purpose, the uncer-
tain of state should be considered. Here, the controller including the uncertain
of state (refer to [23]) can be designed as the following forms
u(k) = Kidiag[1 + vk1; 1 + vk2;    ; 1 + vkn]x(k) (7)
where vki is independent Gaussian white noise for state components withE[vki] =130
0, E[v2ki] = 
2 and E[vkivkj ] = 0.
Integrating the equations (3) and (7), one has
xi(k + 1) = (Gi +HiKidiag[1 + vk1; 1 + vk2;    ; 1 + vkn])x(k) (8)
Under the controller (7), the following control objective is expected to achieve
Denition 2: System (8) under the attack sequence i is said to be stochasti-
cally stable, if, for any initial x0 and i 2 f0; 1; 2    ;Mg, the following condition135
holds: 1X
k=0
E(k x(k); i k) <1 (9)
For convenience, the following useful lemma should be pre-presented:
Lemma 1 [24]: The autonomous systems x(k + 1) = Aix(k) with Ai, i 2
f1; 2;   Ng obey a Markovian process are stochastically stable, if and only if
there exist a set of symmetric and positive denite matrices Pi satisfying140
ATi PAi   Pi < 0 (10)
where P =P
i
pijPj .
Remark 2: System (2) represents the condition that there is no DoS attack
happened. From the description above, it is easy to know that system (3)
involves system (2) as a special case. Because the nal result of DoS attacks
is the lack of control packets due to network blocked, the actuator channel we145
only considered in this paper has it certain representativeness. Moreover, both
the DoS attacks in control loop and the stochastic noise in feedback loop are
considered in this paper, which is dierent from the aforementioned works in
[16, 21].
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3. Resilient control under DoS attacks150
In this section, four Theorems are provided for stability and stabilization for
the studied system with the DoS attacks. In the subsection 3.1, under the case
of full-known transition probabilities of DoS attacks, Theorem 1 is provided to
judge the stability of the closed-loop system (8), and Theorem 2 is used to solve
the resilient controller gain. In the subsection 3.2, under consideration of the155
case of partial known transition probabilities of the DoS attacks, Theorems 3
and 4 are used to judge the stability and design the resilient controller gain of
the closed-loop system (8), respectively.
3.1. Resilient control with full-known transition probabilities
In this subsection, we address the case where the full transition probabilities160
of the DoS attacks are known in the design of resilient controller for the studied
system.
Theorem 1. For the attack sequence i 2 S which modulated by Markov tran-
sition probability (4), the closed system (8) is stochastic stable if there exist
positive denite symmetry matrices Pi > 0 such that165
[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
MX
j=0
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]  Pi < 0 (11)
Proof: Let i = i. Constructing the following attack sequence-dependent Lya-
punov function
V (xi(k)) = x
T
i(k)Pixi(k) (12)
E[V (xj (k + 1))ji = i]  V (xi(k))
= xTj (k + 1)
MX
j=1
pijPjxj (k + 1)  xTi(k)Pixi(k)
= Ef[(Gi +HiKidiag[1 + vk1; 1 + vk2;    ; 1 + vkn]))xi(k)]T
MX
j=1
pijPj
[(Gi +HiKidiag[1 + vk1; 1 + vk2;    ; 1 + vkn]))xi(k)]g   xTi(k)Pixi(k)
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Let R = diag[1+vk1; 1+vk2;    ; 1+vkn]) which represents the uncertain of state
and noticed that R = RT , E[vk] = 0, D[vk] = 
2. As well known, the covariance170
is usually to describe the dispersion degree of random variables, then, the un-
certain of state can be measured by E(RTR) = diag[1 + 2; 1+ 2;    ; 1+ 2].
Therefore, for each denite symmetry matrices Pj > 0, we compute the expec-
tation for each subsystem j which obey the Markovian transition probabilities
as follows175
EfxTi(k)[Gj +HjKjdiag[1 + vk1; 1 + vk2;    ; 1 + vkn])]T )
MX
j=1
pijPj
[Gj +HjKjdiag[1 + vk1; 1 + vk2;    ; 1 + vkn])]xi(k)g   xTi(k)Pixi(k)
= xTj (k)[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
MX
j=1
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]xj (k)  xTi(k)Pixi(k)
= xTi(k)([Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
MX
j=1
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]  Pi)xi(k)
By Lemma 1, if [Gj+(1+
2)HjKj ]
T
MP
j=1
pijPj [Gj+(1+
2)HjKj ] Pi  0
for all i 2 S holds, the system is considered as stable.
Let  = minf[Gj + (1 + 2)HjKj ]T
MP
j=1
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]  Pig
where minf?g is the minimum eigenvalue of matrix ?, then the following in-
equality holds180
E[V (xj (k + 1))ji = i]  V (xi)   xTi(k)xi(k) =  kxi(k)k2 (13)
for all i 2 S.
So, for 8xi(k) 6= 0
1X
k=0
E[kxi(k)k2jx0; 0]   1E[V (x0)] <1 (14)
Combining (9), (13) and (14), the system (8) is stochastic stable.
Proof completed.
185
Theorem 2. For the attack sequence i 2 S which modulated by Markov tran-
sition probabilities (4), the closed system (8) is stochastic stable if there exist
9
positive denite symmetry matrices Xi > 0; Yi > 0 such that0BBBBBB@
 Xi   
p
pi1G1X1 + (1 + 
2)H1Y1  X1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
p
piMGMXM + (1 + 
2)HMYM 0 0  XM
1CCCCCCA < 0 (15)
The resilient controller gain with attack sequence i can be obtained by Ki =
YiX
 1
i .190
Proof: According to the (11), the following inequality is hold by exploiting
Lemma 1:0BBBBBB@
 Pi   
p
pi1P1(G1 + (1 + 
2)H1K1)  P1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
p
piMPM (GM + (1 + 
2)HMKM ) 0 0  PM
1CCCCCCA < 0 (16)
DeneXi = P
 1
i and pre-and-post multiplying both side of (16) with diagfP 1i ; P 11 ;    ; P 1M g.
Let Xi = P
 1
i and Yi = KiXi,we can obtain (15).
Proof completed.195
3.2. Resilient control with partial-known transition probabilities
In this subsection, we address the case where the only part known transition
probabilities of the DoS attacks are known in the design of resilient controller
for the studied system.
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For convenience, we rst denote the following notations. If the transition
probabilities pij due to attack sequence i 2 S are known in the ith row, we
denote it as
P ai =

pi1 pi2    pij    pip:

(17)
If the transition probabilities pij due to attack sequence i 2 S are part known
in the ith row, we denote it as205
P bi =

xi1 xi2    xij    xiq

(18)
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Noted that P ai + P
b
i = Pi where the Pi represents all elements in i-th row for
probabilities transition matrix P .
Based on the above notations, the following two theorems are derived by use
of the Lyapunov theory.210
Theorem 3. For the attack sequence i 2 S modulated by partial-known Markov
transition probabilities (4), the closed-loop system (8) is stochastic stable if there
exist positive denite symmetry matrices Pi > 0, such that
[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2Pai
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
 
X
j2Pai
pijPi < 0 8j 2 P ai (19)
[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
TPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
 Pi < 0 8j 2 P bi (20)
Proof: According to(11) and
M 1P
j=0
Pi =
P
j2Pai
pij +
P
j2P bi
pij = 1, one has
[Gj+(1+
2)HjKj ]
T (
X
j2Pai
pij+
X
j2P bi
pij)Pj [Gj+(1+
2)HjKj ] (
X
j2Pai
pij+
X
j2P bi
pij)Pi < 0
Namely,
[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2Pai
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ] 
X
j2Pai
pijPi
+[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2P bi
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ] 
X
j2P bi
pijPi < 0
Let215
	ai = [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2Pai
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ] 
X
j2Pai
pijPi
	bi = [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2P bi
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ] 
X
j2P bi
pijPi
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and 	i = 	
a
i +	
b
i . At the same time, 	
b
i can be re-stated as
	bi = [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2P bi
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ] 
X
j2P bi
pijPi
=
X
j2P bi
pij [[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
TPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]  Pi]
If 	i < 0 holds, thus
	ai = [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
T
X
j2Pai
pijPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ] 
X
j2Pai
pijPi < 0
	bi =
X
j2P bi
pij [[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
TPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]  Pi] < 0
Because
P
j2P bi
pij > 0, for 8j 2 P bi :
[Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]
TPj [Gj + (1 + 
2)HjKj ]  Pi < 0
Proof completed.
Theorem 4. For the attack sequence i 2 S which modulated by the partial220
known Markov transition probabilities (6), the closed-loop system (8) is stochas-
tic stable if there exist positive denite symmetry matrices Xi > 0; Yi > 0 such
that0BBBBBBB@
  P
j2Pai
p
pijXi   
p
pi1G1X1 + (1 + 
2)H1Y1  X1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
p
pipGpXp + (1 + 
2)HpYp 0 0  Xp
1CCCCCCCA
< 0 8j 2 P ai (21)
0BBBBBB@
 Xi   
G1Xj + (1 + 
2)H1Y1  X1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
GqXq + (1 + 
2)HqYq 0 0  Xq
1CCCCCCA < 0 8j 2 P
b
i : (22)
The resilient controller gain with attack sequence i can be obtained by Ki =225
YiX
 1
i .
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Proof: According to the (19) and (20), the following inequalities are hold by
exploiting Schur complement lemma0BBBBBBB@
  P
j2Pai
p
pijPi   
p
pi1P1(G1 + (1 + 
2)H1K1)  P1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
p
pipPp(Gp + (1 + 
2)HpKp) 0 0  Pp
1CCCCCCCA
< 0 8j 2 P ai
230 0BBBBBB@
 Pi   
P1(G1 + (1 + 
2)H1K1)  P1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
Pq(Gq + (1 + 
2)HqKq ) 0 0  Pq
1CCCCCCA < 0 8j 2 P
b
i
Similar to Theorem 2, dene Xi = P
 1
i and pre-and-post multiplying both side
of (21) and (22) with diagfP 1i ; P 1j ;    ; P 1p g and diagfP 1i ; P 1j ;    ; P 1q g,
respectively. Let Xi = P
 1
i and Yi = KiXi, we can obtain (21) and (22).
Proof completed.
4. An example235
In this section, under three dierent DoS attack scenes, a numerical example
is given to show the validity of the proposed theoretical results.
Considering the continue-time system in [16]
_x(t) =
0BBB@
 1 0  0:5
1  0:5 0
0 0 0:5
1CCCAx(t) +
0BBB@
0
0
1
1CCCAu(t) (23)
Suppose there is DoS attacks in the networked control of the system (23)
with the attack sequence i 2 f1T0; 2T0; 3T0g, where T0 = 0:1s. Based on
Eq.(3), the system parameters under the newly sampling period f2T0; 3T0; 4T0g
are given as
A1 =
0BBB@
0:8187 0  0:0955
0:1772 0:9048  0:0094
0 0 1:1052
1CCCA B1 =
0BBB@
 0:0025
 0:0001
0:1025
1CCCA
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A2 =
0BBB@
0:7408 0  0:1404
0:2398 0:8607  0:0204
0 0 1:1618
1CCCA B2 =
0BBB@
 0:0215
 0:0021
0:3237
1CCCA
A3 =
0BBB@
0:6703 0  0:1837
0:2968 0:8187  0:0353
0 0 1:2214
1CCCA B3 =
0BBB@
 0:0377
 0:0048
0:4428
1CCCA
Suppose there exist attack strategies A = fa1; a2; a3g and defend strategies
D = fd1; d2; d3g. The transition probabilities matrix of Markovian packets240
dropout which caused by two sides of attack and defend may be follow the three
cases for the system (3) with the above given parameters.
Case I: DoS with full-known transition probabilities
If the transition probabilities for all attack strategy ai and defend strategy dj
can be perceived, the full-information transition probabilities of packet dropout
due to Markov modulated DoS attack is given by
P =
0BBB@
0:3 0:4 0:3
0:4 0:2 0:4
0:5 0:1 0:4
1CCCA
By Theorem 1, the group of resilient controller gains for each subsystem can
be obtained245
K1 = [0:1473; 0:0281; 2:0853]
K2 = [0:2405; 0:0599; 2:1004] (24)
K3 = [0:2774; 0:0196; 2:1109]
Let the initial state as x0 = [1:6; 1:2; 0:4]T . Without loss of generality,
we adopt the 2T0 as the current state of packet dropout. The state response
under Markov modulated DoS attack is shown in Fig.3.
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Fig. 3 State response under full-information Markov attack with controller
gains (24)
Clearly, if full-information transition probabilities which depend on attack
strategies and defend strategies are given, the designed resilient controller with
the gains (24) is eective for arbitrary transition probabilities pij 2 [0; 1] of
packets dropout.
Case II: DoS with part-known transition probabilities
If not all transition probabilities for all attack strategy ai and defend strategy dj
can be perceived, the partial-known transition probabilities of packets dropout
under Markov modulated DoS attack are given by
P =
0BBB@
? 0:7 ?
? 0:8 ?
0:75 ? ?
1CCCA
We set the same initial states and adopt the same controller gains (24) in
Case I, the state response under Markov modulated DoS is shown in Fig.4.250
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Fig. 4 State responses under partial-known DoS attacks with the controller
gains (24)
Comparing Fig.3 and Fig.4, one can see that the system (3) is unstable
if we some transition probabilities are unknown to us. This is tally with the
actual situation. If we blind to the attackers' behavior, the designed controller
are doom to failure which motivated our to seek a new control strategies. By
Theorem 3, the controller gains can be obtained255
K1 = [0:2771; 0:1524; 2:6394]
K2 = [10:7303; 5:4914; 2:1557] (25)
K3 = [1:3862; 1:1260; 3:0455]
With the same initial state in case I and the new resilient controller gains (25),
the state responses is shown in Fig.5.
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Fig. 5 State responses with the controller gains (25)
It is noted that the resilient controller gains (25) can stabilize the NCS but
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less eective than the resilient controller gains (24). In fact, there are not always
ecient for arbitrary partial-known transition probability except that the known260
probabilities are large enough. This implies that: the more knowledge about
two sides of attack and defense, the ecient for our designed resilient controller.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a resilient control problem of networked control systems under
DoS attacks has been addressed. When the attacker jam the control packets265
from the actuator, the discrete time Markovian jump linear system has been
used to model the process of packets dropout. Considering the concealment
of attacks and using the Lyapunov method and LMIs technique, the resilient
control schemes under full or partial known transition probabilities have been
well investigated. Moreover, the stochastic noise in feedback loop has also been270
considered. Although the proposed control strategy shows the `resilience' to dif-
ferent degrees of packets dropout due to DoS attacks, there are no compensation
strategy to compensate the packets dropout which reect the `passivity' of our
proposed control strategy. How to consider the resilient control for NCSs with-
out assuming the DoS attack satisfying some predened stochastic distributions275
and how to compensate these packets dropout in the scene of DoS attacks are
left for our future study.
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